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Abstract 
Standard Macroeconomics treats animal spirits as a source of uncertainty 
disturbing otherwise rational expectations. But, Keynesian animal spirits ensue 
from suboptimal emotional responses to socioeconomic status change beyond 
matters of uncertainty. This paper identifies such spirits with the disturbance from 
the optimal decision-making implied by an emotional well-being utility function. The 
introduction of a policy-maker, holding its own view of private welfare in a society of 
emotional individuals, generates by itself, i.e. in the absence of animal spirits, 
uniform business fluctuations. This is the result of the income redistribution needed 
to reconcile the policy-maker’s with the emotional individual’s view of private 
welfare. Consequently, if animal-spirits induced fluctuations are already present 
when a policy-maker is introduced in the economy, the aim of policy intervention 
should be the design of that income redistribution that would not aggravate the 
business cycle but that would end up in uniform only cycles, with the aid perhaps of 
discretionary interest rate policy. Nevertheless, if animal spirits do not exist when 
the policy-maker enters the system, the income-redistribution induced cycles may 
incite such spirits by themselves in which case the cycles will not be of the uniform 
type. All comes down to “income and emotion”, to an ageless and ecumenical fact 
of life, complicated purposefully or not by authority. 
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‘Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of 
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of 
animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the 
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative 
probabilities’: This is precisely what Keynes (1936, 162) had said about animal 
spirits in his General Theory. Since then macroeconomics tried successfully to 
distance the field from the notion of animal spirits, because they are not 
susceptible to data and reason (or control by government); uncertainty and risk 
came to replace it – rightly from one point of view as we shall soon see – 
rationalizing concepts such as business confidence accordingly (Roskam 2014). 
Indeed, many, like Frantz (2005) and Shiller (2015) see in animal spirits sheer 
irrationality. But, the truth of the matter is that Keynes himself did not identify 
animal spirits with uncertainty contrary to what mainstream macroeconomics 
maintains. Akerlof and Shiller’s (2009) widely appreciated book on the subject 
points to the possibility of ‘predictable irrationality’. And, others, like Pech and Milan 
(2009) and Schwartz (2010) try to appreciate animal spirits in the light of cognitive 
psychology towards some behavioural macroeconomics. It is this last approach to 
the matter, which is promising, simply because irrationality is not predictable and 
much more rationalizable by definition. The matter is really one of rationalizing 
emotions. 
According to Pham (2007) and Cohen et al. (2007), for example, emotions arise 
from a cognitive appraisal of the emotional object or situation in terms of its 
meaning for one’s well-being: This is the case with the so-called “integral emotional 
responses”, otherwise emotion states are defined to be “incidental” ones. And, 
according to Scherer (2011), for instance, three conceptions of rationality need to 
be distinguished in discussing the relation between emotion and rationality. The 
first is rational in the sense of intellectual/inferential, emphasizing reasoning, 
consistency, and logic à la Kahneman (1994). The second is rational in the sense 
of functional/purposeful, pertaining to the optimality of the means-end relationship 
à la Aristotle’s notion of practical reason (Nicomachean Ethics, Ross 1908) or 
Weber’s (1964) Zweckrationalität. And the third type of rationality is rational in the 
sense of reasonable/consensual, associated with behaviours and actions that are 
“rational” not because they are logically consistent or serve one’s self-interest but 
because they fulfill broader societal goals, comply with superior moral values, or 
back greater evolutionary purposes even against one’s material self-interest, much 
à la Weber’s (1964) Wertrationalität, (Clore 2005). 
These definitions of emotion types and rationality types in connection with emotion 
are standard in the relevant literature. Could it be that the strict separation between 
ratio and passio, maintained by mainstream economics, derives methodologically 
from Plato’s notion of a tripartite soul that categorically distinguishes between 
cognition, emotion and motivational urges (Republic IV, Jowett 1892)? The answer 
is negative, because Plato, the inventor of the notion of ‘rationality’ (Moss 2008), 
also points out that virtue is a matter of ‘harmonizing the three [parts of soul], just 
like the three notes in a musical scale, lowest and highest and middle’ (Republic 
IV, 443d, Jowett 1892). So, not only realism but also methodology dictates the 
incorporation of emotion to economic theory towards the investigation of the 
influence of animal spirits on microeconomic behaviour and macroeconomic 
performance. It is straightforward logically to associate incidental emotion states 
with uncertainty and risk, which need not bother us here because it has already 
received much attention by the literature.  
Therefore, a first approximation to the notion of animal spirits is what the present 
paper tries to offer by confining analytically attention to integral emotional 
responses in connection with functional rationality. Animal spirits may be 
emanating from other rationality types and from incidental emotion states with 
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implications far more complex than “simple” uncertainty. But, outside the scope of 
uncertainty, the emotion-rationality nexus studied here is the simplest one 
analytically, because a utility function may be employed and because there does 
exist in the literature Parada-Daza and Parada-Contzen’s (2013) utility function 
incorporating emotional well-being. The next section offers a formal definition of 
animal spirits based on a version of this utility function. It is followed by a section 
clarifying this definition from a macroeconomic point of view in a Kaldor-type 
environment. The paper concludes with still another section pointing to the 
complexity of a holistic approach to animal spirits, encompassing not only integral 
emotional responses but incidental emotion states too, the latter in the form of 
uncertainty. Such an approach becomes much more effortful when one attempts to 
incorporate in the analysis consensual rationality and inferential rationality; the 
former in the form, for instance, of Staveren’s (2007) ethics in economics, and the 
latter by considering explicitly framing effects and the like.  
2. The Formal Definition of Animal Spirits 
To model the genuinely Keynesian notion of animal spirits, the one which is 
dissociated from uncertainty, their presence is introduced into an otherwise certain 
environment. Following Parada-Daza and Parada-Contzen (2013), the version of 
individual emotional utility function considered here is: 
, 1 2 ∙ 					 1  
where , and , are constants, with 1, showing the proportion utility derives 
from pure rationality and emotion, respectively, under the particular historical 
period being experienced by the individual in its lifetime. ∈ 0,1  captures 
emotion regulation by constantly adjusting the emotional response either itself 
qualitatively (fine-tuning) or its intensity (volume adjustment) given the intent of the 
emotion. Alternatively, in terms of Kahneman and Deaton’s (2010, 16489) 
distinction between emotional well-being (‘the frequency and intensity of 
experiences of joy, stress, sadness, anger, and affection that make one's life 
pleasant or unpleasant’) and life evaluation (‘thoughts that people have about their 
life when they think about it’),  and  might be connected with life evaluation and 
emotional well-being, respectively. And, ∈ 0,1  is the share of individual income, 
, to total steady-state income, ,  and is a choice variable too, from the point of 
view of how much one wants to work to increase one’s share to total income: 
⁄ ⁄ , where  is labor,  is the wage rate,  is some positive coefficient, 
and the constant 1. The focus is on  rather than on , because it hinges upon 
the broader matter of income distribution, which is of concern herein.  
Emotions are exogenous to the economy and give rise to instability once  is not 




						 2  
That is, there is an optimal feedback loop between the dynamic unfolding of 
emotion and the evolution of socio-economic status, which once ruptured, animal 
spirits and instability will crop out. Put differently, it is one thing to react emotionally 
when it is required (emotion elicitation), another to react with the appropriate 
emotion (emotion differentiation). One reason, for instance, why 2  may be 
violated is cognitive biases like those of prospect theory. Animal spirits and the 
subsequent instability are the outcome of inappropriate emotional response; 
inappropriate from the viewpoint of disturbing 2 . Figure 1A, with  on the 
horizontal axis and ,  on the vertical, illustrates this utility function under 
0.6, and 0.4. The blue line assumes that 0.2 while the red line is based 
on stronger emotions described by a value of 0.6. The destabilizing influence 
of  is clear once 2  is violated; much more so when emotion is strong 
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0.6	 . 0.2  and national income is higher as is the case with the left-hand of 
the figure where 2 whereas in the right-hand part, 1. Now, animal spirits 
are defined to be the outcome of the violation of 2 , with subsequent destabilizing 
influence as depicted by Figure 1A. Increased income share is not always 
consonant with increased utility unless emotion adjusts as indicated by 2 , leaving 
the area below the blue or red line, leaving that is, welfare unchanged.  
Ideally, lines such as these,  lines, should be parallel to the horizontal axis, but  
may lag behind , welfare may not be stable over the lifetime, and what really 
matters is that instability does not influence total welfare once the individual passes 
away: The areas above and below the parallel  line cancel each other out. Yet, 
comparing areas below blue and red lines in Figure 1A, emotions cause a big loss 
in welfare in the right-hand part, which is not the case in the left-hand part with the 
lower . So, animal spirits do take their toll on welfare, and welfare instability may 
be attributed to the effort of the individual to deal with the welfare changes coming 
out of the violation of 2 . Much more so when one considers emotion to be the 
main source of utility as the comparison between the black lines 0.4, 0.6  
and the violet lines 0.6, 0.4  in Figure 1B illustrates under 1. This 
awareness of the individual regarding the role of emotion, prompting action and 
reaction on its part, is what prevents a characterization of it as irrational. There 
does exist rationality, which although it may not be the emotion-free, 0 ⇒
sin 2 ∙ 0, is nevertheless some sort of emotional rationality. As such, it 
tries to solve the optimization problem: 
max
,
1 2 ∙  
Figure 1A 
 blue: , 0.2 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.2   
red: , 0.6 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.6  
 blue: , 0.2 0.6 1 2 0.4 2 0.2 4  
red: , 0.6 0.6 1 2 0.4 2 0.6 4  
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Figure 1B 
velvet: , 0.2 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.2  
black: , 0.2 0.4 1 0.6 2 0.2  
 
velvet: , 0.6 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.6  
black: , 0.6 0.4 1 0.6 2 0.6  
where:  is the income constraint. The emotional rationalization first-order 
conditions include 2  and: 
2 ∙ 2 ∙
1
0						 3  
or, in short: 
						 3′  
 is the marginal utility of individual income. The marginal private welfare from 
individual income given by the first two terms (and divided by ), has to be equated 
with this marginal utility. That is, emotion may be inducing private welfare 
fluctuations over the life span, but once it is rationalized in the sense of 
endeavouring to minimize unpleasant outcomes out of 2 ’s disturbance, 3′  will 
come to characterize the individual over the lifetime. According to this condition, a 
person who is emotionally rational too, thinks that if for some reason 2  were 
violated, it would be optimal on its part if the temporary welfare ups and downs had 
counterbalanced each other in the end of its life, having been locked up by . 
Such a result is in line with the hypotheses regarding the self-fulfilling 
socioeconomic-status beliefs in the long-run (Piketty 1998).  
Nevertheless, we have seen that once 2  is disturbed, 3′  is unlikely to be 
satisfied as well: Animal spirits have consequences, which the policy-maker has to 
address. Suppose that the incumbent has a world view reflected through the 
following Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function: 
∑  
∑ 1 2 ∙  
where the ’s are weights attached to individual ’s so that 1, and the 
summation operator, ∑, applies to the entire population. Figure 1 depicts the way 
the policy-maker views individual utility when 1 . Figures 2 and 3 show this 
under 0.5 and 1.5, respectively, continuing for comparison but also 
simplicity purposes to assume that 1. These diagrams verify the comments 
made on the basis of Figure 1, and suggest in addition the three of them that the 
increase in  amplifies utility volatility.  (and ) reflect policy-maker’s perception 
of society, which clearly has a powerful effect on the course of the economy. In this 
paper, it is the ineffective policy-maker who allows exogenous emotion to become 
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endogenous to the economy, provoking ultra-emotional spirits that reinforce 
instability. The reaction of citizenry in response to erroneous policy-making is 
labelled ultra-emotional because adds to pre-existent exogenous emotion.  
Figure 2 
blue: , 0.2 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.2  
red: , 0.6 	 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.6  
blue: , 0.2 0.6 1 2 0.4 2 0.2 4  
red: , 0.6 0.6 1 2 0.4 2 0.6 4  
Figure 3 
blue: , 0.2 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.2  
red: , 0.6 	 0.6 1 0.4 2 0.6  
blue: , 0.2 0.6 1 2 0.4 2 0.2 4  
red: , 0.6 0.6 1 2 0.4 2 0.6 4  
Now, the policy-maker’s optimization problem is: 
max
,
∑ 1 2 ∙ ∑  
where: ∑  is the relevant income constraint. That is, authorities are interested 
not only in income distribution, i.e. in manipulating  so that the average, so to 
speak,  is matched, but also in keeping  at its steady state. The first-order 
conditions are: 
2 ∙ 2 ∙
1
1 2 ∙ 0 
or: 
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0						 4  
and 
∑ 1 ∑ 0 ∑ 0 ⇒ 0					 5  
 is the marginal utility of national income to the policy-maker. Being equal to zero 
to satisfy 5 , it would in turn imply from 4  that ⁄ 0 and hence, from 3′  
that 0, which indeed might be the case at a steady state of universal bliss. But, 
once such an eventuality is unrealistic, 5  explains that this can be so because  
1 ∑ 0 ⇒ 1 ∑ ⁄ ⁄ 0 ⇒ ∑ ⁄ 0						 6  
that is because more or less than  is expected by the policy-maker to be 
distributed among the individuals, and expectations are frustrated. So, although 
individuals would be content if 2  and 3′  were satisfied, the policy-maker will be 
pleased only if what it considers to be universal bliss ( 0 ⁄ ) is 
attained. There is clearly a public-private sector discrepancy in the valuation of 
individual welfare even if there were no animal spirits: From 3  and 4 , 
; the two theta are not the same. And, the residual income implied by 
6  goes, as we shall see shortly in the next section, as rate of return to physical 
capital. 
Steady-state general equilibrium requires the conversion of 6  into equality: 
∑ ⁄ 						 6  
in which case, ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ∑ ⁄⁄ . According to the policy-maker this 
is the condition describing prudent policy-making when 2  and 3′  are violated, or 
the same, in the presence of animal spirits. Improper is the policy-making when the 
marginal private welfare from individual income differs from the marginal social 
welfare of the same income as seen by the policy-maker. But, we just saw that the 
presence and only of a policy-maker causes such a discrepancy even if all in the 
economy runs smoothly. This discrepancy, engendering loss of confidence and 
trust towards the policy-maker, is the source of emotions, of ultra-emotional spirits, 
destabilizing the economy (a) by itself in the form of uniform cycles as we shall see 
below, if 2  and 3  are satisfied, (b) even further than exogenous emotion does if 
2  and 3  are violated. If 1, condition 6′  is necessary but not sufficient to 
prevent the emergence of ultra-emotional spirits as may be seen through the 
following, for example, second-order derivative:        
4 ∙ 2 ∙
1
1 0 
This derivative is always negative if 1 in which case, condition 6′  is both 
necessary and sufficient to ensure absence of animal spirits. But, if 1, the 
second derivative will be negative only if its positive term is absolutely smaller than 
its negative one. In this case, additional conditions beyond the satisfaction of 6′  
are needed to have a negative cross-partial and prevent the appearance of animal 
spirits when 2  is breached. 
3. The Macroeconomics Perspective of Animal Spirits 
Additional insight into the meaning of 6  and 6′  may be gained by considering it 
from a macroeconomic point of view à la Dana and Malgrange (1993) as follows. 
Emotion frequency, , changes with time according to some function,  and any 
disturbance of 6′  and change thereby in  implies disequilibrium in the goods 
market and discrepancy between investment, 
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			 7  
and saving,  
			 8  
altering  according to 
			 9  
or inserting 7  and 8  in 9 , 
1
						 10  
where:  is the accelerator,  is the propensity to save,  is the speed of 
adjustment of supply to demand, and the derivative with respect to , is used in the 
place of the time derivative entering customarily dynamic analysis. 
In view of, 
∑ ⁄  
10  may be rewritten as follows, 
∑ ⁄ 			 10′  
which in turn implies that 
∑ ⁄ 1 				 11  
That is, in view of 6′ , at steady-state general equilibrium, 0, which prompts 
another perspective of what prudent policy-making means as follows: One might 
have sensed from the diagrams above that the area below the blue lines tends to 
be greater than that under the red lines, suggesting a higher welfare level for the 
less emotional individuals given the presence of animal spirits. Proper policy-
making according to the policy-maker means income redistribution aiming at 
compensating for welfare differences owing to differences in animal-spirits related 
emotion, ceteris paribus; policy-making should be neutralizing “exogenous”, non-
policy induced animal spirits if it does not want to become part of the problem. This 
is very important, because it tends to take care of the destabilizing influence 
caused by the introduction and only of a policy-maker in the economy, too. Animal 
spirits come up and have critical consequences for the stability of output once 
policy does not accomplish this task. 
One can see this through what stability means under 0, by noting that outside 
the stead-state, conditions 3  and 4  imply that ⇒  
1 2 ⇒ 
2
1 1
						 12  






Stability in the form of uniform cycles is what macroeconomic stability and steady-
state mean for the policy-maker when society consists of emotional individuals. If 
there are no animal spirits, such cycles are the result of the income redistribution 
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pursued by the policy-maker to reconcile the social (its own) view of private welfare 
with the individual’s view of its own welfare. And, uniform oscillations are 
consequently what the policy-maker would have in mind as the goal of its 
intervention to subdue animal spirits when they do exist. If they do not exist, the 
income-redistribution induced cycles may trigger animal spirits by themselves in 
which case they will not be of the uniform type. 
The course of physical capital, , would be shaped by these developments if  
 
which is a Kaldor-like assumption, and which in view of 7  gives: 
 
The path of  is a scaled down version of that of . So, once condition 2  is 
violated for some reason, and is not plausible to expect to be restored through 6′ , 
what becomes important as second best policy-making is to ensure that 
1
0 
i.e. that the cycles are prevented from obtaining a downward trend, as prescribed 
by the relationship: 
⋚ 0			 			 ⋚  
Income redistribution is one policy means towards that direction, but the rate of 




and, circumventing the matter of cycles, one can postulate that 1 ⇒
1 ⁄  so that 
1
2 1 1 ⁄
 





obtaining in turn from 12 : 
1 1 1
2
1 						 13  
The cross-partial derivative ⁄  in the Appendix is negative, capturing the 
important role interest rate policy can play in influencing animal spirits. 





blue: 0.1 1 ⁄  
red: 0.01 1 ⁄  
black: 0.001 1 ⁄  
The intuitive reason is pretty clear: In the presence of animal spirits, capital 
markets are inefficient, the loanable funds doctrine simply does not hold, and there 
can be no natural rate of interest (Pilkington 2014). Yet, note that the relevant 
policy prescription is not exactly Moore’s (1988) ‘horizontalism’ that the central 
bank set a certain rate of interest as a policy target and then let the quantity of 
money float. This would be the case if the matter of cycles was assumed away as 
is the case behind Figure 4; an assumption made for algebraic tractableness. But, 
animal spirits are synonymous to fluctuations, and interest rate policy should be 
discretionary, taking on a flavour of “verticalist” interest rate float. As Arestis (2011) 
points out, a Taylor rule presumes the existence of a natural rate of interest à la 
Wicksell (2007 [1898]), which is not the case here unless a fluctuating natural rate 
is somehow contemplated… What is for sure is that: ‘…the short-term output 
responses are more sensitive to animal spirits in the fixed interest rate regime than 
in the variable one. Thus the interest rate response under the variable interest rate 
regime tend to reduce the impact of animal spirits on the transmission mechanism, 
thereby reducing the volatility in this transmission’ (De Grauwe 2012, 53). 
Moreover, the animal spirits in this paper are first and foremost exogenous, 
unrelated to economic uncertainty, which only the ineffective policy-maker can 
trigger and add to the exogenous emotion. The viewpoint about a liquidity 
preference as a buffer against economic uncertainties should be appreciated 
accordingly. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up: Animal spirits ensue from suboptimal lifetime integral emotional 
response to socioeconomic status change under functional rationality. The 
introduction of a policy-maker, holding its own view of private welfare in a society of 
emotional individuals, generates by itself, i.e. in the absence of animal spirits, 
uniform business fluctuations. This is the result of the income redistribution needed 
to reconcile the policy-maker’s with the emotional individual’s view of private 
welfare. Consequently, stability restoration in the presence of animal spirits 
involves policy-making to restore the uniform character of cycles through income 
redistribution and perhaps discretionary interest rate policy. Nevertheless, if animal 
spirits do not exist, the income-redistribution induced cycles may incite such spirits 
by themselves in which case the cycles will not be of the uniform type.  
The situation becomes much more perplexed when the uncertainty originating in 
incidental emotional states is added to this picture. Incidental states may be taking, 
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for example, the form of a random disturbance term, , with mean, ,̅ and variance, 
, in an environment in which  is uncertain too, with mean, , and variance, . 
Under such circumstances, one has to choose  and  so as to keep  as close to 
0 on average as possible: 
min ≡ 1 1 2 0  
1 1 2 1
1 2
2 1 1 2 						 14  
where  is the expectations operator and  is the correlation coefficient between  
and . It is clear that introducing the simplest holistic approach to animal spirits in 
economics complicates the discipline considerably, and this may be one reason of 
confining attention only to the implications from uncertainty. Much more so when 
such an approach should also be encompassing not so much the explicit treatment 
inferential rationality’s cognitive biases that invalidate (2) as the matter of 
consensual rationality à la say Staveren’s (2007) ethics.  
The simplest way to incorporate ethics in 1  is to add a term indicating how the 
rest of society affects the individual, with the positive/negative sign if the influence 
is positive or negative: 
, 1 2
1 1 1 2 1 						 15  
The bracketed term after the “ ” sign reflects society’s utility function, which is 
independent of how the individual feels: 1; society does not care about a 
given individual. The first-order conditions are now: 







∓ 2 1 2 1 0 
It is clear that the coordination between integral emotional response and 
socioeconomic status change becomes much more difficult than under 2 . The 
same difficulty characterizes individual effort to even out the temporary welfare ups 
and downs over the lifetime vis-à-vis what 3′  dictates. And, of course, even more 
likely becomes the destabilizing “capacity” of the policy-maker.  
Now, this scenario behind 15  has to be merged with the one behind 14  to have 
a truly holistic approach to animal spirits. What such an intricate venture will 
produce in practice is certainly increased alertness in policy-making, improved fine-
tuning. Of course, a piece of the story will always be missing in the real world, but 
fine-tuning minimizes the fears that something which is theoretically wrong has 
been done, that the theoretical background of policy intervention was not a sound 
one, in the sense of falsifying observations. In this connection, it is 
methodologically improper to identify animal spirits with an exogenous random 
shock of a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium (Howitt 1992) because the 
source of the shock may be anything, and a result like ‘Bayesian updating induces 
convergence to the equilibrium with positive probability even if people start with no 
definite belief that animal spirits affect the profitability of hiring’ (Howitt 1992, 493) 
may be quite misleading in so far as policy-making is concerned. The same holds 
at least policy-wise when animal spirits are tried to be approached empirically as 
‘interrelations between waves of optimism and pessimism’ (Chauvet and Guo 
2003, 140) because any such approach is subject to Lucas critique.  
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In any case, the profession does already know that when crises break up, a piece 
of the story is missing because of animal spirits beyond those associated with 
uncertainty. So, the least the profession can start doing about it from now on, 
analytically, of course, and in so far as it purports to be empirically relevant, is to 
cease confusing “nature” with smoothness. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) report a 
great many reasons attesting to this call; and cognitive psychology, “twice” as 
many: All come down to “income and emotion”, to an ageless and ecumenical fact 
of life, complicated purposefully or not by authority… It is this fact of life that made 
Keynes (1923, 80) emphasise that the: ‘…long run is a misleading guide to current 
affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too 
useless a task, if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us, that when the 
storm is long past, the ocean is flat again.’ Indeed, ‘psychological ideas… are more 
important in Keynes’s economic theory than is sometimes recognized’ (Barnett 
2015, 307), which perfectly justifies his support for discretionary policy-making as 
this paper does, too. Does a version of Okun’s law	 10′  not favour active 
employment policy-making beyond discretionary monetary policy? 
Appendix 












where Λ 2 2 2 2 2  
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